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Abstract
This paper experimentally tests the predictions of a principal-agent model in which
the agent has biased beliefs about his ability. Overcondent workers are found to
earn lower wages than undercondent ones because they overestimate their expected
payo, and principals adjust their oers accordingly. Moreover, the prot-maximizing
contract distorts eort by varying incentives according to self-condence, although only
the most successful principals use this strategy. These ndings have implications for the
labor market; in particular, self-condence is often correlated with gender, implying
that principals would prefer to hire men over women simply because they are more
overcondent.
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1It is a well-documented fact that people do poorly when assessing their own performance
and abilities (Svenson (1981), Weinstein (1980), Lichtenstein et al. (1982); see Taylor and
Brown (1988) for an overview). Most work has focused on overcondence, which has been
found to aect nancial markets and managerial decision making (Odean (1999), Malmendier
and Tate (2005), Malmendier and Tate (2008)), as well as market entry decisions in labora-
tory experiments (Camerer and Lovallo (1999), see their paper for further references). But
individuals can also be undercondent, especially if they perceive a task as dicult (Clark
and Friesen (2009), Kruger (1999), Moore and Cain (2007)). These belief biases are strong
and persistent enough to lead to signicant changes in outcomes and payos. For example,
Barber and Odean (2001) nd that nancial traders, convinced that they can \outsmart" the
market, make losses of up to 3.9% of annual income. Grubb (2009) shows that the typical
cell phone plan menu is designed to screen customers who overestimate the precision of their
demand prediction, making them pay more for their service.
This paper demonstrates that biased beliefs can also play an important role in the classical
moral-hazard situation. I study a moral-hazard model in which the agents have biased beliefs
about their own ability, and test its predictions in a laboratory experiment. To illustrate
the basic idea, suppose that output depends positively on the agent's ability and eort, and
incentive provision requires that a high output is rewarded with a high wage. Now assume
that the employee is undercondent, that is, he underestimates his ability and therefore
the chance that his output and wage are high. This means the principal must oer him
a contract with higher expected wage than an unbiased agent would accept. Moreover,
although it distorts eort, she will optimally shift some of the wage payments from the high
to the low outcomes to reduce the loss from the belief dierence. Conversely, if the agent
is overcondent the principal provides very high incentives and pays a lower expected wage
than an unbiased worker would receive for the same eort.
This paper tests experimentally if the agent's decision to accept a wage oer is aected
by the self-condence bias, and if principals adjust their contract oers accordingly. The
experiment allows me to control for ability, self-condence and eort, which are typically
unobserved in labor market data. I nd that subjects in the employee role accept lower
(higher) expected wages if overcondent (undercondent). The prot-maximizing strategy
in the experiment is to reduce the expected payment and raise incentives for overcondent
agents and vice versa for undercondent ones. Subjects in the employer role correspondingly
decrease the payments to overcondent agents and thereby raise their own prot, but increase
the expected wage for undercondent agents. The most successful principals also adjust
2incentives as predicted by the theory.
The results of this study have potentially important implications for the labor market. In-
centive contracts are shown to entail redistributive eects between employers and employees.
In addition, when eort and ability are complements the theoretical predictions imply that
an overcondent (undercondent) employee works too hard (too little) for given incentives,
and the prot-maximizing contract raises (lowers) incentives even further. This is in sharp
contrast to an eciency-minded social planner, who would choose atter (steeper) incentives
to correct for the distortion. Interestingly, the incentives chosen by the principals in the ex-
periment resemble the social planner choice more closely than the model would predict, and
the majority of principals do not make use of the prot-maximizing incentive adjustment. I
will explore this issue in some detail in section 4.2, with particular attention to the possibility
that the subjects play a pooling equilibrium in a signaling game.
A second implication of the model is that employment outcomes will systematically dier
for populations that dier in self-condence. For example there is robust evidence for gen-
der dierences in self-condence in both the psychology and economics literatures. Barber
and Odean's female traders are less overcondent and make fewer losses than their male
counterparts; women underestimate their chances of success in tournaments, while men en-
ter contests they are unlikely to win (Gneezy et al. (2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004),
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)1; see also Beyer (1990), Deaux and Farris (1977), Bengtsson
et al. (2005)). This correlation implies that an employer who makes contract oers based
on self-condence will appear to discriminate between men and women. Indeed, I nd that
self-condence in this experiment is correlated not only with gender but also with race, and
that Asian (or Asian-American) and female subjects are sorted over-proportionally into the
undercondent group. Conversely, note that the correlation of self-condence with attributes
like gender and race means that these attributes can serve as an indicator for the agent's
self-condence if beliefs are not directly observed. In a variant of statistical discrimination
it is then actually optimal to oer dierent wages to men and women or to white and Asian
employees.
The next section summarizes the related literature. Section 2 discusses the theoretical
results in a general principal-agent model. Section 3 describes the experimental setup. The
experimental results are presented in section 4, and section 5 concludes.
1Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) focus on the residual gender gap in tournament entry
after controlling for beliefs as evidence for women's dislike of competition. But a sizable
portion of the gap is accounted for by belief dierences.
31 Related Literature
The theory predictions in this paper draw on an earlier working paper (Sautmann (2007)),
but independent work by De la Rosa (2007) and Santos-Pinto (2008) is closely related. Both
authors use models similar to the experimental setup used here, where output is discrete and
the agent can be over- or undercondent about the probability of high output levels or about
the eect of eort onto these probabilities. Santos-Pinto discusses the eect of an agent's
bias on the principal's welfare, while De la Rosa focuses on the impact on eort and agents'
welfare and the interaction of overcondence with risk aversion. Adrian and Westereld
(2009) and Keiber (2006) study the eects of other types of belief biases on the allocation of
risk between agent and principal. A related question, that of using contract oers to screen
agents with heterogenous prior beliefs, has been investigated by Eliaz and Spiegler (2008)
and Landier and Thesmar (2009).
The principal's contract choice problem studied here is also related to the literature on con-
tracting under non-common priors, started by Morris (1994), which argues that individuals
with dierent beliefs can mutually benet from speculative trade by betting on outcomes
to which they attach dierent probabilities. Eliaz and Spiegler (2007, 2009) look at the
mechanism design aspect of such bets when the state of the world cannot be independently
veried. The size of the bet is constrained because players may manipulate the bet after
the state is realized (ex post), by playing a Nash equilibrium dierent from the outcome in
the \bare" game. The principal solves a similar mechanism insofar as the wage dierence
between high and low outputs acts as a bet on the agent's ability, constrained only by the
eect of the wage dierential on the agent's unobservable eort. The eort distortion that
stems from the principal's adjustment of incentives can be viewed from this angle: if the bet
on output is too high, the agent is incentivized to (ex ante) manipulate the probability of
the output that lets him win the bet.
To my knowledge this paper is the rst to test contract choice with biased beliefs experi-
mentally. It also adds a theoretical observation about the dierence between the principal's
contract choice and that of a social planner and the implications for eort and eciency.
Unlike in the literature on speculative trade, which can only be mutually welfare enhanc-
ing if the goal is to maximize subjective expected payos, it is assumed here that both the
agent and the social planner value the actual expected outcome according to the unbiased
ability distribution of the principal. This heightens the importance of the link between self-
condence and gender or race, because it means that overcondent (undercondent) agents
can actually lose (win) from their belief bias.
42 Belief Biases in a Principal Agent Model
Consider a principal-agent setting in which the agent is hired to work with a technology
owned by the principal. The agent produces good y with a stochastic output function,
which depends on the agent's ability a and eort e:
y = f(a;e) + ;
where f is strictly increasing in a and e. Assume that f is smooth with bounded derivatives,
and that the error term  is independent of a and e and has mean zero. Eort costs the
worker C(e). For simplicity, assume that both parties are risk neutral.
Self-condence enters the model through the agent's beliefs about his own ability. The
principal, who is unbiased, holds beliefs about a that are identical to the true ability dis-
tribution P, but the agent's belief is given by a dierent distribution A. This might reect
that the principal has experience from contracting with many agents and is therefore less
biased than the agent. The agent is overcondent if A dominates P and undercondent if P
dominates A in the sense of strict rst order stochastic dominance. The principal is aware
of the agent's belief bias and can therefore adjust her wage oer accordingly. Note that the
two parties can \agree to disagree" if they hold dierent priors regarding agent ability, even
if they update their beliefs in a Bayesian fashion.
Since the principal cannot monitor the agent's eort, she must condition the worker's wage
on output y. We restrict attention to linear wage contracts of the form W(y) = ry + K,
where r is the piece rate and K is a lump-sum payment (a few words on this restriction
later on). For a given contract and eort level, the agent therefore expects his payo to be
rEAf(a;e)   C(e) + K, and the principal's expected prot is (1   r)EPf(a;e)   K. The
subscripts on the expectations operator indicate that the same random variable, ability, is
being evaluated under two dierent priors. After receiving a contract oer, the employee
decides if he wants to accept based on his outside option and then chooses an eort level.
The Agent's Eort Choice. The benchmark for the analysis is the surplus-maximizing
eort level according to the agent's beliefs, ea, for which
EAf(a;e
a)   C(e
a)  EAf(a;e)   C(e) for all e: (1)
This is the eort level he would choose if he owned the production technology himself. If
instead given a piece-rate r, the agent's eort choice e(r) must satisfy the incentive constraint
rEAf(a;e(r))   C(e(r))  rEAf(a;e)   C(e) for all e: (IC)
5If r = 1, he chooses e(r) = ea. For any other piece rate r, (1) and (IC) imply
EAf(a;e
a)   EAf(a;e(r))  C(e
a)   C(e(r))  r[EAf(a;e
a)   EAf(a;e(r))]; (2)
and for an r greater than one this can be satised only if e(r)  ea, and vice versa.
Lemma 1 A piece rate r > 1 leads to an eort choice e(r) greater than ea, while a piece
rate r < 1 implements an eort level e(r) below ea. The statement holds strictly if ea is
unique.
The Principal. Now consider a prot-maximizing principal. For any given piece rate r
and corresponding eort choice e(r) she will choose K such that the participation constraint
is satised with equality,
rEAf(a;e(r))   C(e(r)) + K = U; (PC)
where U is the agent's outside option. Substituting for K in the principal's objective function
(i.e. her expected prot), her optimization problem is
max
r [(EAf(a;e(r))   C(e(r))) + (1   r)(EPf(a;e(r))   EAf(a;e(r)))   U]:
The rst term of this expression equals the agent's expected net output. By selling the
production technology to the agent, i.e. letting r = 1 and charging a lump sum that equals
agent's expected net surplus, the principal can realize at least a prot of EAf(a;e) C(e) U.
Note that this is the maximal possible prot if agent and principal have the same beliefs.
Now suppose the agent is undercondent, so that EPf(a;e)   EAf(a;e) > 0. Starting at
r = 1, the principal increases her prot by replacing some of the agent's exible pay with
a xed wage, i.e. lowering r and raising K such that the participation constraint remains
satised. The increase in the lump-sum payment K is (1   r)EAf(a;e), compensation for
the lower output share the agent expects to receive. But this is more than oset by the
share in the expected prot that the principal now keeps for herself, (1   r)EPf(a;e). Even
though there will be a small loss due to the downward distortion of eort, the net eect of
this change on the principal's prot is positive. For a formal argument, note that at r = 1,













2By the implicit function theorem there is a dierentiable e(r) describing the agent's






6The rst term is zero since ea maximizes EAf(a;e) C(e), so that reducing r leads to a strict
increase in prot. By contrast, raising it to r > 1 would not only distort eort away from ea
but it would also impose an additional cost on the principal. In the case of an overcondent
agent, the argument is reversed. Now the principal pays a high piece-rate { inducing a higher
eort level { and lowers K. This is protable because it reduces the agent's expected wage
from the principal's perspective.
Observation 1 A prot-maximizing principal chooses rp > 1 and induces an eort level
ep > ea if the agent is overcondent, and rp < 1 and ep < ea if he is undercondent.
Their overly optimistic output estimate means that the overcondent agents lose from this
employment relationship. From (PC) it is immediate that an overcondent agent's expected
pay under P is less than his outside option U, even though he believes he will receive U. On
the other hand, as long as r is positive, the undercondent agent actually gets more than U.
Observation 2 Under the agent's beliefs, his expected payo always equals U. But under
the principal's belief it is less than U if the agent is overcondent and more than U if he is
undercondent (unless rp < 0).
As a consequence, overcondent workers tend to be more attractive as employees. This is best
seen when writing the principal's prot as rEAf(a;e(r))+(1 r)EPf(a;e(r)) C(e(r)) U. In
the special case where output is separable in eort and ability, so that the agent's response to
incentives is independent of his beliefs and e(r) is the same for both types of agents, it is clear
that this expression is greater for any given r if the agent is overcondent, and therefore that
an overcondent employee generates higher prots for the employer (as long as rp > 0). More
generally, the expression can only be lower for an overcondent agent if the distortion to e(r)
is much stronger for him, overcompensating the dierence in rEAf(a;e(r)). Santos-Pinto
(2008) shows in a discrete model that overcondent agents increase the principal's prot
and undercondent agents decrease it, provided the optimal incentive scheme is increasing
in output, and eort and self-condence are complements (so the discrepancy in expected
output according to agent's and principal's beliefs is higher when eort is higher).3 For the
purposes of the experiment, the following observation is sucient.
Observation 3 If output is separable in ability and eort, the prot from hiring the over-
condent agent is strictly higher under the principal's beliefs as long as rp > 0 for the
undercondent worker.
3Eort and self-condence are complements here, but I only consider linear contracts.
7In summary, the belief bias and the principal's response to it lead to systematic dierences
in payos, eort levels and incentives between over- and undercondent agents. An overcon-
dent agent has a lower net payo than an undercondent one, but works harder, and the
principal makes higher prots from him. If men are more likely to be overcondent, this im-
plies that they have a lower net payo from working than women. It should be emphasized
that their expected wage may still be higher than women's, since they also exert greater
eort.4
The results so far have particular signicance if ability and eort are complements in pro-
duction, so that higher ability implies a higher marginal eect of eort. In this case we can
compare the principal's contract choice with the surplus-maximizing eort level e a social





The assertion here is that social welfare is evaluated at the ability distribution P, without
taking into account the agent's subjective ex-ante utility. Note that all previous results hold
without reference to a \true" distribution of ability, whereas now we take a stand which
beliefs to use for welfare judgements.
Intuitively, an overcondent agent overestimates the marginal return to eort and therefore
works too hard, and the opposite holds for an undercondent worker. Unlike a prot-
maximizing principal, the planner chooses incentives that correct this distortion. The rst








Now suppose the agent is overcondent and ability and eort are complements in output,
so that f(a2;e2)   f(a2;e1)  f(a1;e2)   f(a1;e1) for any a2 > a1, e2 > e1. If e > ea,
4Note that I did not fully solve the model in order to focus on the main insights. In some
cases, an optimum may not exist; e.g. if the agent is overcondent, the principal's payo may
approach innity as r ! +1. For a nite optimal r it is sucient that EAf(a;e) C(e) !
 1 as r ! +1( 1) but EAf(a;e) EPf(a;e) ! 0; in other words, the belief discrepancy
becomes unimportant at extreme eort levels. Alternatively, limited liability or risk aversion
impose constraints on the piece rate. Although we have only considered linear contracts,
the main insights carry over to other settings, see e.g. Santos-Pinto (2008). In general, the
principal will raise relative wages for those output levels that have a higher probability weight
under A than under P; in other words, overcondent agents are paid more for high outputs,
thereby adding to their work incentives, and vice versa for undercondent employees.
8the expression f(a;e)   f(a;ea) must be a positive, increasing function of a. But then (3)
contradicts rst order stochastic dominance of A over P, so it must be that ea  e.
Lemma 2 Suppose ability and eort are complements. If the agent is overcondent the
ecient eort level from the agent's perspective is higher than that from the planner's (prin-
cipal's) perspective; ea  e. If the agent is undercondent then ea  e. The inequalities
are strict if a and e are strict complements and either ea or e is unique.
Suppose the social planner implements the social optimum by way of a linear wage contract,
either by employing the agent herself, or by regulating the contract terms. A biased agent
will not choose the socially optimal eort level at a piece rate of one, so the social planner
corrects the eort distortion by lowering the piece rate for an overcondent type and raising
it for an undercondent agent. Combining the lemma with observation 1 shows that the
principal, by contrast, distorts eort away from the social optimum:
Observation 4 If ability and eort are complements, rp > r and ep > e if the agent is
overcondent, and rp < r and ep < e if the agent is undercondent.
Observation 4 illustrates the importance of studying heterogenous beliefs. It contradicts
the conclusions of the classical moral hazard model, where the principal implements the
same eort level as a social planner would (realizing the rst best outcome with risk neutral
parties and the second best under risk aversion). Here, the principal does not imitate the
planner to counteract the distortion from the agent's eort choice, but even adds to it. Since
the principal maximizes prot, the resulting welfare loss is borne by the agent.
If eort and ability are substitutes, lemma 2 of course works in the opposite direction, and
the agent's bias may reduce the eciency loss from the principal's distortionary choice of
incentives (yet even then the principal will in general not choose the socially optimal level
of eort). Substitutability of eort and ability may occur for instance when the agent works
towards a xed quota or goal. However, there are many tasks in which ability and eort
naturally complement each other. Take the example of time (eort) vs. cognitive skills or
specialized knowledge (ability): in the same time, a more able employee will produce higher
output than his less able colleague.
3 The Experimental Design
The experiment to test the predictions of the previous section consists of two stages and
a questionnaire, all carried out on the computer. In stage 1, ability and self-condence
9are measured, and in stage 2 subjects interact as agents and principals. The questionnaire
collects data on personal characteristics. Subjects can earn and spend points, which are
converted into US dollars at the end of the session.
At stage 1, before receiving instructions on the rest of the experiment, participants take a
10-item, multiple-choice trivia quiz, modeled after the quizzes in Healy and Moore (2007).
Afterwards they are asked to guess their own trivia score. They earn points both for correct
answers to quiz questions and for guessing accuracy.5 The dierence between the guess and
the true score is used as a measure of the subject's level of self-condence. After the guess,
stage 1 concludes and subjects are given instructions for stage 2.
At the start of stage 2, participants are assigned the role of employer or employee. To create
two groups with discernibly overcondent and undercondent agents in all experimental
sessions, the subjects in each session are ordered by level of self-condence, and the highest
and lowest quartiles become employees in group O(vercondent) and group U(ndercondent)
(in the experiment, they were neutrally named group 1 and 2). The remaining subjects
become employers and are randomly assigned to either group. Subjects are informed that
the group assignment is based on the results from Stage 1 but not given more detail.
Stage 2 has 30 paying rounds, split evenly into treatment (T) and control (C) blocks. The
order of T and C is randomized in each experimental session. The experiment therefore uses a
mixed design: the group division is maintained throughout the experiment (between-subject
design), while both groups undergo the treatment and control (within-subject design). This
helps to control for unobserved dierences between over- and undercondent agents, e.g. in
risk aversion or overall optimism, as well as dierences between treatment and control that
are common to both groups, e.g. dierences in the perceived level of risk.
In each round of stage 2, an employer and an employee from the same group are paired
up to enact the principal-agent contracting situation. In the treatment T, \ability" (a)
is represented by the trivia score of the employee. Agents have no information about the
score besides their own guess, so they are subject to the self-condence bias, reected in the
dierence between that guess and their true trivia score. The principals, on the other hand,
learn the trivia scores and score guesses of the employees in their group (although not that
of the individual agent they are matched with). This means they are unbiased and aware of
the agents' bias.
5The payo for guess G when the actual score is S is 100 (G S)2. Under risk-neutrality,
the payo maximizing guess is the expected value of S, i.e. the subject's ability expectation
that we are interested in here.
10The control C is identical, except that a is now a number between 0 and 10, randomly
assigned to the employee by the computer, while the agent's test score (ability) does not
aect the outcome. Employers and employees both learn the numbers assigned within the
group (but not the number of each individual agent), so that everyone has the same, unbiased
information about the distribution of a. The assigned numbers have the same distribution
as the trivia scores of the agents in the group. Average ability is therefore constant between
treatment and control, and the principals' beliefs are the same.6 During instructions, all
subjects see examples of the screens on which the employer and employee make decisions,
so that it is common knowledge what information is available to each side.
The following is a detailed breakdown of a typical round.
Contracting in a Round in Stage 2: At the beginning of each round, a principal and an
agent from the same group are randomly and anonymously matched. For the purpose of
the experiment, a discrete version of the model with two output levels, high (H) or low (L),
is implemented. If the outcome is H, the principal earns 95 points, if it is L, 60 points.
The employer makes a wage oer to her employee by choosing wages wH 2 f0;:::;95g
and wL 2 f0;:::;60g for H and L, respectively. There are three output draws, so that the
principal can make prots between 3(95 wH) and 3(60 wL), and the theoretical maximum
earning per round is 285.
After the employer submits the two wages, the employee is shown the oer on his screen.
He has a budget of 20 points. If he rejects the oer, he receives an additional 100 points and
the principal gets 0 points. Otherwise he chooses between investing the 20 points (in full)
or investing nothing. The budget and the restriction on wages serve to separate past and
present payos. Each subject is provided feedback about payos at the end of the round.
The probability of the high outcome as a function of the agent's investment (the equivalent
of eort) and his score { either the trivia score in the treatment, or the assigned number in
the control { is described by table 1 (available to the subjects in graphical form). Investing
the 20 points increases the chance of outcome H in all three draws by 30%. For a risk-
neutral employee, this is protable whenever the wage gap wH   wL is at least 23. The
expected output increase is 31.5, so it is socially optimal, and prot-maximizing if the agent
is unbiased, to induce the high eort level.7
Table 10 in the appendix lists the optimal contracts when the agent's self-condence level
6The principals might notice that the distributions are similar, but the order in which
scores/numbers are displayed is randomized.
7Note that this is true here, but does not hold in general when wages are bounded.
11Table 1: Probability of the high outcome for both investment levels and dierent a.
Probability of H Score/ability a
0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
Investment 0 0.05 0.25 0.45 0.65
20 0.35 0.55 0.75 0.95
is known, assuming optimal eort choices, prot-maximization and risk neutrality on both
sides. The numbers in this experiment were chosen so that a decrease in the agent's self-
condence by one level (i.e. the score guess is, for example, 6, but the score is 7 or 8) makes
it protable to distort investment. The employer in fact optimally chooses a negative wage
dierence for the undercondent type. At the same time, the wage gap is maximized for the
overcondent agent. More generally, the principal's prot rises with incentives if the agent
is overcondent and falls if he is undercondent (see table 9 in appendix B). The data from
the experiment is used to test the following general predictions:
1. The subjective expected payo is the same for all agents.
2. The expected prot for the principal is higher if her employee is overcondent.
3. The expected payo is higher for the undercondent than for the overcondent agent.
4. All else equal an overcondent agent receives a lower expected wage than an under-
condent agent.
5. The strength of incentives (wH   wL) is lower for undercondent agents, and if the
belief bias is large enough, they are induced to work less than overcondent agents.8
In section 4.2 I will also examine the (hypothetical) choice of a social planner, given the
behavior of the agents in the experiment.
Note that predictions (2)-(4) rely on wH   wL  0 for both types of agents. This is not
optimal, since prot-maximization requires negative incentives for undercondent agents. In
8Observe that a high ability level leads to a greater weight on the marginal utility at the
high over the wage and thus under risk aversion to a lower expected marginal utility of eort,
so that over- and undercondent agents may exert dierent eort for equal incentives. This
may confound the eort distortion from the self-condence bias. As we will see this is not
an issue here.
12that case we would expect, for example, higher prots for the principals in the treatment
compared to the control under both over- and undercondence. However, as will be seen,
principals in the experiment do not set negative incentives for undercondent employees, and
this behavior was not entirely unexpected.9 Instead of presenting the full set of conditional
predictions I therefore focus here on the case where wH wL is always positive. Note also that
prediction (5) can be evaluated separately from the others, in the sense that the principal
may adjust the wage level to the self-condence bias without also adjusting incentives. For
example, if the agent is overcondent, the principal can benet from simply lowering both
the high and the low wage until (PC) is satised with equality, and we will see that this is
what the principals in the experiment do. Of course, according to theory increasing incentives
would allow them to lower the expected wage even further, and I will discuss this discrepancy
in more detail in section 4.2.
The description of the experiment concludes with a few remarks on the connection between
theory and experiment and the design choices for the latter. These choices draw in part on
the insights from earlier laboratory experiments on moral hazard. The rst full test of the
hidden-action model was conducted by Berg et al. (1992), followed by Epstein (1992) and
Keser and Willinger (2000).10
Preferences. The assumption of linear, separable preferences in the model is of course also
a simplication. If the experimental subjects are risk-averse, the high risk inherent in large
wage dierences may put a limit on the principal's incentive adjustment in response to the
agent's belief bias (see also De la Rosa (2007)). It can be shown, however, that the model
predictions continue to hold qualitatively when some risk aversion is present (see appendix
A for details).
Modied setup. The experimental design deviates in several points from the original
principal-agent model. The simple binary specication for output, wages and investment was
9Some incentive adjustment was expected, but that the principals do not choose nega-
tive \rewards" for high outcomes was considered a distinct possibility. The choice for the
experimental design was between restricting the principal's choices to contracts with only
positive incentives or oering more than two investment levels { both at a loss of clarity
and tractability for the subjects { , and a potential ambiguity in the theory predictions and
results, and I opted for the latter.
10In addition, a range of experiments have studied agency situations in the context of
preferences for fairness and reciprocity and intrinsic motivation (esp. Anderhub et al. (2002);
see Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for an overview).
13Table 2: Optimal contracts, all experimental sessions and groups.
opt. wage oers di-in-di
session group scores guesses C T incentives investment
wL wH wL wH
1 O 3 3 3 4 5 5 6 5 6 7 32 55 0 73
U 5 5 6 7 8 3 4 4 5 4 27 51 44 2 116 1
2 O 1 4 4 5 7 5 5 5 6 8 32 55 0 73
U 5 5 7 7 8 2 3 3 5 4 27 51 45 0 119 1
3 O 2 5 5 7 4 6 5 7 34 33 34 33
U 6 6 6 7 4 3 4 5 27 51 44 2 66 1
4 O 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 32 55 0 73
U 5 6 7 8 8 3 4 6 7 6 27 51 34 33 75 1
5 O 4 4 5 6 6 5 7 7 32 55 0 73
U 4 6 7 8 3 4 5 4 34 33 44 2 91 0
weighted average 94.7 0.83
chosen to make outcome and action spaces easy to understand and display on a computer
screen. The three output draws ensure that the eect of eort and ability creates real payo
dierences. Expected output is separable in ability and eort, implying that the prot
prediction of observation 3 is unambiguous and that any eort distortion is a consequence of
the principal's response to the agent's bias. In other words, the self-condence bias aects
eort only through the principal's contract oer (obs. 1), whereas the agent's optimal eort
level ea equals e (i.e. lemma 2 holds only weakly). Observation 4 still applies to suciently
undercondent agents, i.e. eort is distorted away from the optimal level.
Perhaps a more controversial deviation from the theory is that the principal in the experi-
ment does not know which agent in her group she is dealing with. Rather, she has an equal
chance to interact with one of four or ve dierent agents. This choice was made on the
one hand to prevent the principal from identifying individual agents and playing a repeated
game with them, and on the other to reduce the possibility of the agents learning from the
principal's contract oer. At the root of this is the diculty of inducing dierent priors in an
experiment. While dierent ability priors are plausible in real life principal-agent situations,
where both employers and employees have a rich history of interactions and little knowledge
of the sources for each others beliefs, this is not always so in an experiment.
Fang and Moscarini's (2005) paper on belief biases and incentives illustrates the problem.
14The authors study the role of overcondence for wage compression and show that, if a rm
makes dierentiated contract oers based on its estimate of worker ability, workers can infer
their true productivity from the oer. This means their `morale' is destroyed if they initially
hold overly optimistic beliefs, and it can be optimal to pool all contract oers. By a similar
argument, imagine the principal knows the exact test score of each agent and this is known
to all subjects. If the principal oers low or negative incentives to an undercondent agent,
the agent may conclude that his beliefs are incorrect. However, when an employer faces a
group of agents, each employee can at most partly update his beliefs, since the other agents
may have very dierent test scores and score guesses.
I will return to the possibility of a common prior (and the signaling/pooling equilibria
arising in a game with common priors) when analyzing the principal's choices of incentives
in detail in section 4.2. But even within the original framework of heterogenous priors we
must verify that the theory predictions hold in the new setup. Table 2 calculates the optimal
contract oers for both groups in treatment and control for the actual experimental sessions,
assuming risk neutrality and taking into account that the principal does not know which of
his group's agents he is interacting with. For example, in session 3, group O, the principal
knows that the agent has a score of 2, 5, 5, or 7. Large intra-group dierences can make it
optimal to choose a contract with no incentives, and (3 O) is such a case: the risk of rejection
from the lowest-ability agent (with score 2 and in T belief 4) requires high wages, but the
0.25 chance of meeting the high-ability agent instead, who gets the high wage very often,
makes an incentivized contract too costly. In this case, the contract closest to the at wage
of 33.33 is optimal. This occurs several times in the experiment, but in all but one instance
(investment in session 5) the qualitative predictions above are unaected.
Training and feedback. Previous experimenters, starting with Bull et al. (1987), found
that principals sometimes have diculty in choosing payo-maximizing strategies and make
persistently suboptimal choices if agents' eort is not observed (Keser and Willinger (2000)).
The principals therefore learn the agent's investment choice in each round. Since training
as an agent increases ecient contract choices (Berg et al. (1992)), all subjects are shown
a typical round from the agent perspective before roles are assigned. Principals can also
test what their wage oer looks like to an employee before submitting it. To help subjects
understand the setup it is framed as an employment situation (see Cooper et al. (1999)).
Finally, the rst two rounds in T and C are trial rounds.
Fairness and reciprocity. The experimental literature suggests that agents punish \unfair"
oers even at their own disadvantage, implying that principals may be reluctant to make
15such oers in the rst place. The agents therefore do not learn the principal's payos for
H and L (a placeholder is used in the instructions). This does not aect their optimization
problem, but it prevents them from judging an oer as \unfair". It is also a fairly common
feature in typical employer-employee relationships.
4 Results
The data analysis will focus on the dierential eect of the belief bias on contracting and
outcomes for over- and undercondent agents. Most results are presented as dierence-in-
dierence OLS estimates from individual random eects regressions, with standard errors
clustered by experimental session. The regression equation is
yi;t =  + OT(O  T) + OO + TT + ui + ei;t
for each dependent variable y. The independent variables are indicators for the overcondent
group (O), the treatment periods (T), and the interaction of the two (O  T), which equals
one if a subject in group O is in a treatment period and zero otherwise. The coecient of
interest is the one on O  T: it measures the eect of an overcondence bias relative to
the eect of an undercondence bias, after controlling for group dierences and for any level
eects of the treatment that are the same in both groups.
The experiment was programmed with the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)) and con-
ducted in the computer laboratory of the Center for Experimental Social Sciences at New
York University. Most subjects were NYU undergraduates. There were ve sessions, two
with 16 and three with 20 participants. In three of the sessions (with 56 subjects) stage 2
started with the treatment T, and in two of them (36 subjects) it started with the control
C. Subjects received a US$10 participation fee, and their earnings from the experiment were
converted into US$ at an exchange rate of 0.005. Total prots ranged from 648 to 3043
points for the principals, with a mean of 2001 and a standard deviation of 587, and for the
agents from 3335 to 6208, with mean 4369 and standard deviation 623.
Table 3 lists average ability, score guess, and self-condence level (guess minus actual score)
for the agents in the two groups. On average, the dierence between the estimated and true
trivia score was 1.43 for agents in group O, ranging from 0.75 to 1.6 in the dierent sessions,
and -2.26 for group U (with range -3 to -1.6). In all but session 4, average self-condence
in the undercondent group was below  2, that is, score guesses were more than two points
too low, making it optimal to distort eort downwards (see table 2). Note also that there is
16Table 3: Ability and self-condence of agents in O and U.
Group O (N=23) Mean Std. Dev. Group U (N=23) Mean Std. Dev.
Ability (trivia score) 4.261 1.453 Ability (trivia score) 6.391 1.196
Score guess 5.696 0.974 Score guess 4.13 1.18
Self condence 1.435 0.992 Self condence -2.261 0.964
Table 4: Group averages in treatment and control (aaccepted contracts only).
(O,C) (O,T) (U,C) (U,T)
Exp. prot for principalsa 84.1 89.9 94.0 83.6
Exp. prot for principals 61.7 61.0 76.3 66.6
Realized prot principalsa 89.5 89.7 95.2 88.3
Realized prot principals 63.5 60.3 74.8 68.3
Exp. prot for agents 139.6 133.7 152.7 159.3
Realized prot agents 138.6 132.7 153.5 157.8
Exp. prot, agents' beliefs 138.4 142.7 152.8 147.4
Incentives wH   wL
a 26.6 30.0 17.0 20.6
Incentives wH   wL 28.1 30.0 18.6 21.1
Exp. wagea 139.3 133.2 151.3 161.0
Exp. wage 124.6 115.3 145.2 149.7
Investment (proportion)a 0.62 0.65 0.55 0.59
Oer rejection (proportion) 0.27 0.32 0.19 0.20
an ability dierence of more than two points between groups. It is not surprising that high-
performing individuals will tend to underestimate their outcome and vice versa, assuming
that the actual success rate is subject to some stochastic variation independent of ability.
Sorting subjects by self-condence therefore led to some sorting by test score as well.11 The
dierence-in-dierence design of the experiment will help to lter out this group eect of
ability on outcomes.
11This is reminiscent of Healy and Moore (2007) who point to a robust negative correlation
between self-condence and task diculty as evidence for Bayesian inference.
17Table 5: Random eects regressions: expected prots for principals (aaccepted contracts
only) and for agents under true probabilities and under agents' beliefs.
Exp. prot P Exp. prot Pa Exp. prot A Exp. pr. A's beliefs
coef./(stde.) coef./(stde.) coef./(stde.) coef./(stde.)
OT 8.888 12.701 -12.537 9.640
(7.357) (4.055) (2.996) (2.308)
O -14.583 -8.567 -13.077 -14.372
(12.277) (13.906) (11.144) (10.331)
T -9.642 -7.537 6.542 -5.407
(7.264) (2.849) (2.460) (0.964)
Intercept 76.291 94.159 152.726 152.820
(10.747) (12.625) (9.693) (9.523)
No. obs. 1380 1042 1380 1380
Signicance levels: y: 10% : 5% : 1%
4.1 Group Averages and Dierence in Dierence Estimates
Table 4 lists the averages of all relevant variables by groups and conditions. Tables 5, 6 and
7 report the corresponding dierence-in-dierence estimates. For principals, all (oered) and
accepted contracts are shown separately to distinguish dierences in principals' choices from
variation in what agents were willing to accept.
The expected wage payment and principals' and agents' prots are calculated using the
actual probability of success, as determined by the agent's ability a and her investment
choice. These are the same probabilities used by the computer program in the experiment to
determine the nal outcomes. For completeness, the averages of realized prots are shown
in table 4 as well.12 Finally, the table reports the expected prot according to the agent's
belief about his ability. In the treatment, this belief is assumed to be the agent's score guess
from the rst stage of the experiment, and in the control it is the group average of assigned
scores, known to both agents and principals.
Expected Prots for Principals and Agents. Table 4 shows that the switch from C to T
12Despite the large number of draws, some of the average realized prots are quite dierent
from expected prots. Careful checks of the randomization procedure in the experimental
program and the resulting outcome draws did not yield an obvious explanation, so I am
bound to assume that it was indeed chance.
18Figure 1: Left - period average of accepted expected wage, right - period median of expected
wages between highest rejected and lowest accepted wage.
causes principals' prots to fall signicantly and agents' to rise in group U, whereas this is
not true in group O. Table 5 conrms that across all periods the relative eect of dealing
with an overcondent agent on the employer's expected payos is positive, but negative for
the agents.
But before studying these variables in more detail, consider the averages and the regression
for the agent's subjective expected prot in tables 4 and 5. Unsurprisingly, given how it
was calculated, agents' subjective prot expectation in the control is very close to actual
expected prots, whereas in the treatment agents in O overestimate and in U underestimate
their prot by about 10 points each. However, according to their own beliefs overcondent
agents expect higher prots in the treatment than in the control, and undercondent agents
expect lower prots. This \overshooting" is noteworthy: according to the model, principals
adjust wages to make the agents' subjective expected utility equal to their reservation utility
at all times, and we would expect only a small dierence between T and C (i.e. the coecient
on OU should be small and/or insignicant). Instead subjective expected prot seems to
increase by 9.64 points for overcondent relative to undercondent employees.
As it turns out, this result is most likely a consequence of learning on the part of the agents.
By observing the three outcomes per round in the treatment, agents can make inferences
about their ability as the experiment proceeds. Their belief bias will therefore gradually
decline, and the score guess from the beginning overestimates average real beliefs in O and
underestimates them in U. This interpretation is conrmed by gure 1, which depicts two
measures of the agents' acceptance decisions over time. On the left is the average accepted
19Table 6: Random eects regressions: expected prots for principals (aaccepted contracts
only) and for agents under true probabilities and under agents' beliefs; rst eight periods of
each treatment-group combination (periods 3-10 and 19-27).
Exp. prot P Exp. prot Pa Exp. prot A Exp. pr. A's beliefs
coef./(stde.) coef./(stde.) coef./(stde.) coef./(stde.)
OT 23.671 22.600 -19.274 4.140
(11.902) (5.882) (5.645) (4.023)
O -18.656y -11.244 -11.084 -12.752
(10.994) (14.081) (11.471) (10.407)
T -16.125 -13.536 11.522 -1.573
(10.019) (4.104) (5.219) (2.504)
Intercept 74.886 96.180 150.220 150.887
(9.240) (11.502) (8.634) (8.426)
No. obs. 736 532 736 736
Signicance levels: y:10% :5% :1%
expected wage in each period. Since the average may be \contaminated" by the principals'
oer decisions, the right panel uses the median of all wages that lie between the highest
rejected and the lowest accepted wage of that period as an estimate of the reservation wage.
Both panels indicate an increase in the acceptance threshold in (O,T), but a decrease in
(U,T), and the change is much larger than the equivalent changes in C. This is a clear sign
of learning.13 In what follows I will therefore focus on the rst half of T and C in each
experimental session, where learning eects are less strong. Repeating the regressions for
prots for the rst eight periods (table 6) shows that agents' subjective prot is unaected
by the self-condence bias. Prediction (1) holds despite the positive coecient in the full
regression.
Result 1 Given their (biased) beliefs, agents' subjective payos are unaected by the self-
condence bias, consistent with the prediction that they will be paid their reservation utility
13Any alternative theory would require that the treatment has dierent eects on the
agent's subjective expected utility from the same contract oer in group O and U. A prime
candidate would be a dierential change, from C to T, to the riskiness of the contract oer
in the two groups, but the change to incentives is similar { and on average fairly small { in
O and U.
20in all conditions.
Table 6 also shows that the principal can on average extract 23.7 points from an overcon-
dent employee relative to an undercondent one, a gain of 36% over the average prot of
65.6 points in C. This is not just an eect of dierent agent decisions, because it holds for all
contracts that the principals oer, including rejected ones. An overcondent agent, on the
other hand, makes relative losses of almost the same size, namely 19.3 points on average, or
13% of the average prot of an agent in C. Since incentives are positive in all group-treatment
combinations, this result strongly supports predictions (2) and (3).
Result 2 The principal's expected prot increases when contracting with an overcondent
agent, and decreases when hiring an undercondent agent, compared to an unbiased employee.
Result 3 The self-condence bias decreases the expected prot of an overcondent agent,
but increases that of an undercondent agent.
Group and Treatment Eects. The signicant coecients on T in tables 5 and 6 indicate
that a share of prots is shifted from principals to agents in the treatment. This is because
self-condence is 1.44 in O, but -2.26 in U, so the average agent underestimates his payos
in T. The average true expected payo for agents in the treatment must therefore be higher
than in the control, and that for the principals consequently lower. The negative coecients
on O for the prots of agents and principals are most likely a result of the ability dierence
between O and U. Higher agent ability yields a larger pie to split between the contract
partners in group U.
Wage Oers and Agents' Decisions. Table 7 shows the dierence-in-dierence estimates
for expected wages, incentives, and agents' decisions in the rst eight periods (see table 13
in appendix B for results for all periods). The self-condence bias has a large and signicant
eect on the expected wage.14 The relative eect of agent overcondence on the wage
payment is -20.6 points, 16% of the average expected wage in C. Expected wages decrease
in O and increase in U from C to T. Moreover, the eect is neither accompanied by a jump
in investment rates (higher investment rates would call for higher wages to compensate
agents for their costs) nor by a relative change in rejection rates (which might indicate, for
14The coecients in the regressions for the individual wages (not reported here) are both
negative and have almost the same size, -5.23 for wH and -5.53 for wL. They are signicant
at the 10% level for accepted contracts, but for a one-sided test only when including all
contracts. Recall that the expected wage is the result of three outcome/wage draws.
21Table 7: Random eects regressions: wages and agent decisions, rst eight periods.
Exp. w. Exp. w. Incentives Incentives Invest. Reject.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
OT -20.618 -24.878 0.293 -0.777 -0.052 -0.033
(9.629) (3.707) (5.159) (4.395) (0.081) (0.099)
O -19.453 -10.253 6.734 8.817 0.070 0.103
(15.267) (15.296) (6.235) (5.904) (0.086) (0.066)
T 9.447 14.814 3.364 3.439 0.080 0.033
(2.696) (6.140) (3.080) (2.881) (0.138) (0.101)
Intercept 142.560 149.791 19.668 19.000 0.580 0.217
(11.476) (12.896) (4.321) (4.452) (0.141) (0.052)
No. obs. 736 532 736 532 532 736
Signicance levels: y:10% :5% :1%
example, that principals follow the \wrong" oer strategy, but overcondent agents reject
low oers less often, so that the wage dierence is purely driven by agents' decisions), and it
is present when looking at all wage oers as well as only accepted ones. This suggests that
principals actively respond to the presence of a self-condence bias by adjusting the wage
level, increasing their own prots at the expense of overcondent agents, but yielding to the
higher wage demands of undercondent agents.
Result 4 All else equal overcondent agents are oered { and accept { lower expected wages.
At the same time, however, the principals are not using the wage dierence to modify the
eect of the self-condence bias on their prots. Agents' investments consequently do not
change. The coecient on O T for incentives in table 7, as well as for investment, is close
to zero and insignicant.
Result 5 The self-condence bias has no eect on the wage gap wH   wL. There is conse-
quently no change to the agent's eort choice.
This result is quite robust across periods and sessions, and I will investigate its possible
causes in more detail in the next section.
Robustness Checks. The analysis was repeated on subsets of the data to check for order or
session eects. There were not obvious outliers when analyzing the data session by session,
22and results did not depend on whether the treatment or control came rst. To test for
spillover eects between treatment and control, three experimental sessions were conducted
that administered either only the treatment, where ability is given by the test score (one
session/16 subjects), or only the control, with ability assigned by the experimenter (two
sessions/36 subjects).15 The results were essentially unchanged.
4.2 Principals' Contract Choices and Optimal Contracts
Although wage levels vary, the principals in the experiment do not seem to adjust incentives
optimally. The oers seen in the experiment may dier from the theory simply because
the principals do not make prot-maximizing choices. But it is also possible that agents'
behavior deviates from the theory predictions, altering the optimal response for the principal.
We would therefore like to nd out what the principals' best contract choice is, given the
agents' behavior in the experiment. To do so I will (a) look at the choices of the highest-
performing principals and (b) use probit estimates of agent-subjects' decisions to identify
the prot-maximizing contract in the experiment.
Prot-maximizing strategies. I rst restrict attention to the principals with the highest
total prot (within each group) and use their contract oers as a proxy for the best strategy
in the experiment. Table 8, part (1) shows averages of all variables for the principals in
the 90th percentile of total prots (three subjects and 90 observations per group). The last
column (DD) lists the dierence-in-dierence estimates, given by the coecient on OT in
a random-eects regression. The results show that the most successful principals did adjust
incentives in the right direction, with a corresponding eect on investment.16 Note, however,
that there are many rejections and that the sum of agents' and principals' prots is smaller
in C than in T, implying that the principals are not realizing the highest possible output.
This indicates that we are still not looking at the principals' best possible strategies here.
In a second approach I use probit estimates for rejection and investment probabilities to
predict the principal's expected prot for all observed wage oers and pick out the prot-
maximizing contracts. The probit results are reported in table 12 of the appendix, and
they conrm that the agents make decisions along expected lines: they reject lower expected
wages more often (although less so under overcondence, echoing result 4), and invest more
15In addition, principals' output levels (prots) in these sessions were raised by 30 points
to give them more exibility and to close the payo gap between principals and agents.
16Total prots are added across T and C, to avoid comparing principals from dierent
sessions. They are not necessarily maximal within each condition T and C.
23Table 8: Prot-maximizing and output-maximizing contracts, rst eight periods only.
(O,C) (O,T) (U,C) (U,T) DDa
(1) 90th percentile of total prot (top 3 subjects, by group), avg. outcomes
Incentives wH   wL 12.3 15.6 20.8 17.4 6.67y
Avg. exp. prot principal 83.2 82.6 84.0 95.7 -12.29
Average exp. prot agent 140.2 143.3 124.6 131.9 -4.29
Avg. exp. prot, agent's beliefs 140.7 147.8 125.9 123.0 10.07
Proportion rejected 0.08 0.08 0.33 0.73 0.17
Proportion investment 0.41 0.73 0.94 0.8 0.46
(2) Highest expected prot (by group and condition), probit estimates
Incentives wH   wL 30 90 20 -32 (112)
Wages wH/ wL 60/30 90/0 45/25 18/50 (57/-55)
Exp. prot principal 92.1 106.2 100.6 105.0 (9.7)
Exp. payo agent 137.3 121.5 120.4 125.3 (-20.7)
Exp. payo, agent's beliefs 137.3 196.7 120.4 157.4 (22.4)
Probability of rejection (tted) 0.05 0.01 0.24 0.16 (0.04)
Probability of investment (tted) 0.79 0.91 0.65 0.08 (0.69)
(3) Highest net output (by group and condition), probit estimates
Incentives wH   wL 80 90 32 45 (-3)
Exp. prot principal 61.5 93.6 56.8 7.0 (81.9)
Exp. payo agent 176.0 143.1 202.8 255.0 (-85.1)
Exp. net output 237.5 236.7 259.5 262.0 (-3.3)
Probability of rejection (tted) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 (0.02)
Probability of investment (tted) 0.98 0.91 0.97 0.93 (-0.03)
a: Coecient on OT in OLS regression in (1), simple di.-in-di. otherwise.
Signicance levels: y:10% :5% :1%
24if incentives are high. Part (2) of table 8 reports the prot-maximizing contracts given these
decisions (i.e., given the choice probabilities for investment and rejection as predicted by
the probit estimate). The optimal strategy involves a large adjustment to incentives and
a negative wage dierence for undercondent agents. Neither a higher risk of rejection nor
other idiosyncrasies in the agents' response to a contract oer seem to aect the original
prediction of the theory.
Result 5 (2) The (hypothetical) prot-maximizing strategy adjusts the wage gap in response
to a self-condence bias, with negative incentives for undercondent agents.
To summarize, all but one empirical result follow the theoretical predictions. But why do
the principals not maximize prots, and in particular not set negative incentives for the
undercondent agents?
Interpreting the Principals' Choices. One explanation may be nonstandard preferences.
Principals might for example have a predilection for equity or fairness and feel uncomfortable
\punishing" an agent for high output. There is some indication that contract oers cluster
near the point (30;47:5), that is, some employers seem to attempt to equitably share their
payos. Since the agents do not actually learn the principal's prot, this would suggest that
employers have a genuine preference for equal splitting. The fairness argument cannot fully
explain, however, why those principals do not choose an incentive compatible contract and
then share the (higher) resulting payo, or why the wage level varies systematically with self-
condence. A second possibility is a taste for eciency on the part of the principals. Table
8 part (3) uses the probit estimates to nd the output-maximizing contracts, equivalent
to what the social planner would choose. These contracts maximize investment rates by
oering strong incentives, and they show no eect of the self-condence bias on the level of
incentives. In that respect principals' choices in the experiment resemble those of the social
planner. Yet output maximization also requires a very large payo to the agent in order to
minimize rejection rates, and this is not what the principals do: overall rejection rates are
around 20% and 30% in U and O, respectively.
Result 6 Net output is maximized, i.e. investment rates are high and rejection probabilities
low, if eort incentives are very strong and expected wages high for all agents. The principals
do choose high incentives throughout, but unlike the social planner they do not oer contracts
that minimize rejection rates.
A nal possible explanation is that both sides behave optimally, but that the dierent-prior
assumption made in the theory is not accurate. Consider for instance the simplied case with
25only one, risk-neutral, agent and assume that agent and principal have originally the same
prior, but the principal observes both A and a signal about a. Upon learning the principal's
beliefs P, the agent would then adopt those beliefs, since P incorporates the principal's
prior information and his observation of A. Similarly, if, as in the experiment, the principal
observes only a noisy signal about A and a, the agent will form beliefs about the true a
following Bayes' rule, and the principal in turn forms beliefs about the agent's posterior.
In this case employers and employees may view the experiment as a signaling game, since
the contract oer can transmit information about P. A pooling equilibrium here implies
that the principal oers a contract that would just satisfy the participation constraint if the
agent was unbiased and P was equal to A. In other words, the principal would adjust the
wage level to the agent's bias, but never choose (meaningfully) dierent incentives. This
suggests that what we see in the experiment may be a pooling equilibrium akin to Fang and
Moscarini (2005), in which all types of agents are oered the same incentives.17
Appendix C discusses the simplied case with only one, risk neutral, agent and gives exam-
ples of possible (partial) pooling equilibria. It is shown that a pooling equilibrium can only
exist if the belief bias for all undercondent agents is relatively small, since their bias implies
relative losses to the principal. If there are some suciently undercondent agents (and
agents are risk neutral and purely rational), the principal will prefer to oer them the same
wage for high and low outcomes, reducing the wage costs from the belief bias in exchange
for low eort. Many more pooling equilibria can be ruled out by a similar argument using
the intuitive criterion for equilibrium selection.
That said, in a broader sense the logic of a pooling equilibrium { where o-equilibrium
beliefs sustain equilibrium strategies { may still apply to the observed contract oers. Ex-
perimenting with \unusual" oers is very costly to the principals, and it may be that the
majority of them so rmly expect contracts with low incentives to be rejected that they
simply never choose them. This reluctance may be heightened by preferences for ecient
outcomes or \fair" incentives which do not punish eort. Indeed, only 2.7% of contracts
overall have a negative wage dierence, oered by only 6 out of the 46 subjects in the princi-
pal role, even though those few observed oers suggest that the agents do not actually reject
17Observe that a separating equilibrium would be played only once, in the rst round;
afterwards we would expect no further learning (see appendix C for examples of separating
equilibria). Since the principal's information is incomplete there would still be belief dier-
ences, and the predictions from the theory section earlier would apply. A pooling equilibrium,
on the other hand, could persist in all rounds.
26them more often (see also table 12 in Appendix C).
From this experiment it cannot be deduced if and why the principals believe that negative
incentives will be rejected. As in the classical signaling model they may think that the
agent will hold unfavorable beliefs after observing such an oer (i.e. negative incentives
are interpreted as an indicator of very high ability), reducing the expected value of the
contract below their outside option. The principals may also follow a more \behavioral" line
of reasoning and anticipate e.g. that agents may retaliate for contract oers with perverse
incentives, or turn down oers which induce an internal conict between ecient and payo-
maximizing eort. These possible pathways remain a topic for further research.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of a moral hazard situation in which the agent can be subject
to a self-condence bias, and then tests the main theoretical predictions in an experiment.
Group and treatment eects are controlled for by using a dierence-in-dierence design.
In line with theoretical predictions, the expected prot for the principals in the experiment
is relatively higher if the agent is overcondent, due to a lower expected wage. Conversely, the
expected prot (under true probabilities) for an overcondent agent decreases, and that for
an undercondent agent increases. At the same time, the agent's subjective prot, calculated
using the score guess as his ability beliefs, is not aected by the self-condence bias as long
as learning is accounted for.
The experiment shows that principals are to an extent able to incorporate the belief bias
into their decisions. They reduce the wage payment for overcondent agents, extracting some
of the agents' prots, and respond to the demand for higher compensation from undercon-
dent agents. In addition, it is shown that the prot-maximizing strategy in the experiment
adjusts incentives to the self-condence bias to realize additional prots. However, only the
most successful principals follow this strategy, and there is consequently no signicant eort
distortion. This may be due to a belief on the part of the principals that negative incentives
will not be accepted by the agents. These beliefs may be enforced by the fact that negative
incentives run counter to standard employment contracts, and that the principals either pre-
fer not to oer such contracts or fear that agents may reject them on account of eciency or
fairness concerns. As a consequence, the outcomes of the experiment resemble the choices
of a social planner more closely than what the theory would have predicted.
Among the subjects in this experiment, both race and gender are informative signals about
27an agent's self-condence. Table 11 in appendix B shows that white male students are
the most overcondent, while women and Asian and African-American subjects relatively
underestimate their scores. This seems to lead to some, albeit statistically not signicant,
sorting among agents: there are 38.1% white and 52.4% Asian agents in O, but 31.6% and
68.4% in U, respectively. When including the experimental sessions conducted for robustness
checks, there is also sorting by gender.
Self-condence is here directly observed and matching is anonymous, so principals cannot
{ and need not { use race or gender to make inferences about the agents' beliefs. The
correlations found here may also not extend to all task domains. Yet at equal abilities a
principal in this experiment would prefer to hire men over women and white subjects over
Asian or Black/African American ones, simply because they tend to be more overcondent.
The importance of this issue for the labor market is clear, and dierences in self-condence as
a possible source for dierences in job market outcomes by gender and race warrant further
research.
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31A Risk Aversion
The theoretical discussion of the eect of self-condence assumed risk neutrality, even though
the classical principal-agent problem is chiey concerned with the trade o between the
optimal risk allocation and optimal incentives. Two issues arise in this context: rst, risk
aversion on the part of the agent or the principal may change the predictions qualitatively
through an interaction with self-condence. Second, there may be a correlation between the
degree of risk aversion and the level of self-condence of the agent. In this case, the eects
of varying risk aversion may confound the eect of dierences in self-condence.
For a simple discussion of risk aversion, let P(a;e) = a + e be the probability of a high
outcome H versus a low outcome L. Let e 2 [0;b] be the investment (eort) level chosen
by the agent, where a + b 2 (0;1) for all possible ability levels a, and b > 0 (to simplify the
discussion, e is assumed continuous, but the results carry easily over to discrete settings).
For a given wage scheme, the agent chooses eort e to maximize
U(wL;e)(1   ^ a   e) + U(wH;e)(^ a + e);
where ^ a is his ability expectation. If utility is separable into a wage utility and an eort
cost and the agent is risk neutral, this amounts to maximizing wL + (^ a + e)(wH   wL)   ce.
The agent chooses ^ e = b if (wH   wL)  c, and ^ e = 0 otherwise (assuming he does invest
if he is indierent). The optimal eort level depends only on the cost parameter c and the
strength of incentives wH   wL, and beliefs do not enter the agent's problem but through
the participation constraint. Given his eort choice, the agent accepts the job only if it is at
least as attractive as his outside option:
(PC) wL + (^ a + ^ e)(wH   wL)   c^ e  U
If the agent is unbiased, the principal maximizes her prot (and net surplus) by choosing
the incentive level wH  wL = H  L (r = 1). Note that this model maps into that from the
theory section in the main text. Let  = 0, and rewrite the wage scheme as r =
wH wL
H L and
K = 3(wL   rL). Now choosing incentives wH   wL and the \base wage" wL is equivalent
to choosing r and K.
Suppose the agent is risk averse, so that his preferences are expressed by a concave utility
function. In the most general formulation, U is a bivariate function in wage w and eort e
as above; but the commonly used variants assume either that U is additively separable in
wage and eort, or that it is univariate, with U(w;e) = V (w e). In the experiment, e is an
investment, lending justication to the second specication. But the fact that e is an upfront
32payment, while the wage is uncertain and realized only after e has been chosen, justies a
formulation like U(w;e) = V (w) C(e). While any specic choice of utility function is open
to criticism, this section will focus on these two versions. The goal is in any case not an
exhaustive analysis of the eects of risk aversion on the model, but an illustration of some
of the possible changes to the predictions for the risk neutral case.
Note that in the additively separable case, the rst derivative of U with respect to e is
 C0(e), the second derivative is  C00(e), and the cross derivatives are zero; in the univariate
case these are  V 0(w   e), V 00(w   e), and  V 00(w   e), respectively.
Assuming that we are at the interior of [0;b], the rst order condition for a utility maximizing
choice of e for the agent is
[U(wH;e)   U(wL;e)] + (1   ^ a   e)Ue(wL;e) + (^ a + e)Ue(wH;e) = 0
Dierentiating the left-hand side with respect to e, wL, and wH gives
dFOC
de
= 2[Ue(wH;e)   Ue(wL;e)] + (1   ^ a   e)Uee(wL;e) + (^ a + e)Uee(wH;e)
dFOC
dwH
= Uw(wH;e) + (^ a + e)Uew(wH;e) > 0
dFOC
dwL
=  Uw(wL;e) + (1   ^ a   e)Uew(wL;e)
The second and third terms in the rst equation are negative under both utility specications,
but the rst term may be positive in the univariate case. This is more likely the larger the
wage gap is. As long as dFOC
de is negative, an increase in wH leads unambiguously to higher
eort. A decrease in wL, on the other hand, can lead to lower eort, if (1 ^ a e)rA(wL;e) > 1,
where rA(wL;e) denotes the coecient of absolute risk aversion at (wL;e). This might
be the case if risk aversion is strong, self-condence small, and the eort level fairly low.
Finally, note that ^ a enters the rst order condition through the probability weights on Ue.
If Ue(wL;e) > Ue(wH;e), as is the case with the univariate utility function, dFOC
d^ a > 0.
To summarize, an increase in the strength of incentives is expected to lead to higher eort,
except possibly if self condence and eort are very low and the agent is highly risk averse.
An overcondent agent may, for the same incentives and utility function, exert higher eort
than an undercondent agent, but at high wage gaps, the eect of an increase in incentives
and the positive eect of self-condence on the response to incentives may be reversed.
Variations in Risk Aversion Take a utility function of the second type and let U1 and U2
be two utility functions with U2 = g(U1) and g concave. U2 represents a more risk averse
33agent.18 The rst order condition for an agent with utility U2 can therefore be written as
g(V (wH   e))   g(V (wL   e))
g0(V (wL   e))
  (1   ^ a   e)V 0(wL   e)   (^ a + e)V 0(wH   e)
g0(V (wH   e))
g0(V (wL   e))
:
Concavity of g implies that
g0(V (wL   e))(V (wH   e)   V (wL   e))
< g(V (wH   e))   g(V (wL   e)) < g0(V (wH   e))(V (wH   e)   V (wL   e));
so that at the optimal eort choice under U1, the FOC for U2 is bounded by
(1   ^ a   e)V 0(wL   e)

g0(V (wH   e))
g0(V (wL   e))
  1

< FOC < (^ a + e)V 0(wH   e)

1  
g0(V (wH   e))
g0(V (wL   e))

For small increases in risk aversion, the rst order condition for U2 is close to zero at the
optimal choice for U1, and continuity implies that the optimal level of e is close by. On the
most general level, since g0(V (wH   e)) < g0(V (wL   e)), the left bound is negative and the
right one is positive, and the direction of change is not determined. But note that the bounds
for the rst order condition depend positively on ^ a and e. If eort and self-condence are
low to begin with, a more risk averse agent is likely to exert less eort in response to the
same incentives (assuming that dFOC
d^ a < 0).
In summary, for the same incentives, a more risk averse agent chooses an eort level \close"
to that of the less risk averse agent. But if risk aversion is negatively correlated with self-
condence (that is, undercondent agents are more risk averse), it may reinforce the self-
condence eect: an undercondent agent cuts his eorts down even further.
Risk Aversion and Incentives How does risk aversion interfere with the result that the
principal wants to shift wages to outcomes whose probability is overestimated by an agent
with a belief bias? For an informal argument, suppose that both the principal and the
agent are risk averse to some degree, and in a slight abuse of notation, let the agent's utility
function be U(w;e) and the principal's V (). Suppose the principal shares the agent's belief
^ a, and assume the contract (wL;wH) is implementing the optimal e under these conditions.
Now change the belief of the principal to a 6= ^ a. Note rst that under the same contract,
e still maximizes the principal's payo. So what happens if the principal changes wH, along
with a change in wL so that the participation constraint of the agent continues to hold?
18Note that this is not easily extended to the rst type of utility function without making
additional assumptions as to how C relates to V . One possibility would be to write U(w;e) =
cV ( e) + V (w), thereby assuming that utility is time separable with some form of time
discounting expressed by c. Higher risk aversion is then represented again by a concave
transformation of V .
34For a small change dwH, dwL   
Uw(wH;e)(^ a+e)




0(L   wL)(1   a   e)
Uw(wH;e)(^ a + e)
Uw(wL;e)(1   ^ a   e)
  V
0(H   wH)((a + e)

dwH   ";
with " representing the loss from a suboptimal choice of e induced by the altered incentives
(note that this loss is small, since e was chosen optimally for the original wage scheme). The
term in brackets is greater than zero if
Uw(wH;e)
Uw(wL;e)
^ a + e
1   ^ a   e
>
V 0(H   wH)
V 0(L   wL)
a + e
1   a   e
We clearly have that ^ a+e
1 ^ a e > a+e
1 a e. If risk aversion is moderate, the principal still benets
from increasing wH   wL, in most cases causing the eort choice to be ineciently high.
Conversely, if the agent is undercondent, the principal will lower wH   wL and reduce
eort. Thus, as in the original model, the principal chooses stronger incentives and induces
a higher eort for an overcondent agent than he would if his beliefs were correct, and vice
versa if the agent is undercondent. The expected utility is identically equal to the outside
option for both types of agents, but lower for the overcondent agent under the principal's
beliefs, and the expected wage is likely to be lower for him, too. Equivalently, the expected
payo for the principal is higher when dealing with an overcondent agent.
B Appendix: Experimental Design and Results
Table 9: Wages wL set so that (PC) is satised for each wH  wL (under risk neutrality and
optimal eort choice). Self-condence (^ a) by one level removed from the true a, i.e. a in 5-6
implies ^ a between 0-4 (U) or 7-8 (O).
Undercondent ^ a < a Overcondent ^ a > a
wH   wL Investment Trivia score a Trivia score a
0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
-20 0 - 118.3 139.3 160.3 73.3 94.3 115.3 -
0 0 - 106.3 127.3 148.3 85.3 106.3 127.3 -
23 20 - 104.0 125.0 146.0 110.6 131.6 152.6 -
40 20 - 93.8 114.8 135.8 120.8 141.8 162.8 -
35Table 10: Payo-maximizing contract choices under risk neutrality.
Underc. ^ a < a Overc. ^ a > a
Trivia score a Trivia score a
0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 0-4 5-6 7-8 9-10
wH   wL -33 -45 -61 73 52 40
wL 35 45 61 0 1 2
wH 2 0 0 73 53 42
Payo P 134 155 180 145 147 155
Payo A 80 74 64 57 69 76
Prots and incentives. Table 9 lists the principal's expected prot as a function of incen-
tives and the self-condence level of the agent under the assumption that the agent's beliefs
are known. Principals' payos are increasing in wH   wL if the agent is overcondent and
decreasing if he is undercondent (except for a nonmonotonicity at 22: there are wage gaps
just below 23 in which prots are lower than at 23, because here the inecient eort choice
is not cancelled out by the gains from the belief bias). At the same ability level, overcon-
dent employees tend to be more attractive, because their eort choice is ecient. Table
10 lists the optimal contract choices. Note that the optimal contract would always involve
wH = 0 for an undercondent agent and wL = 0 for an overcondent one if there were no
indivisibilities.
Table 11: OLS - self-condence as a function of individual attributes.
Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.)
Female -0.410 (0.191) -0.461y (0.273)
Asian -0.563 (0.214) -0.020 (0.299)
Black or African-American -0.977y (0.558) -0.474 (0.795)
Hispanic or latino 0.031 (0.502) 0.057 (0.718)
Other 0.310 (0.643) 0.514 (0.919)
Ability -0.783 (0.069)
Intercept 4.201 (0.437) -0.180 (0.291)
R2 0.531 0.033
No. obs. 128 128
Signicance levels: y:10% :5% :1%
36Self-condence and individual attributes. Table 11 reports OLS regressions of self-condence
on individual characteristics. Observe that the coecient on ability is large and negative:
as an individual's test score increases, she becomes more likely to underestimate it. When
ability is omitted, the coecients on \Asian" and \Black or African American" are smaller
and insignicant. This is because the trivia quiz is not neutral with respect to to gender and
race. For example, Asian subjects had lower scores than white subjects (4.95 versus 5.63).
Agents' decisions. Table 12 reports marginal eects of a probit regression for an agent's
probability of investing and of rejecting the principal's oer. In the investment probit I
include both the wage gap wH wL and a dummy indicating wage gaps over 23, the boundary
for incentive compatibility. In addition, the wage gap is interacted with group and treatment
indicators, since self-condence may interact with incentives under risk aversion (see above).
As expected, an increase in incentives has a strong positive eect on investment probability.
Table 12: Agent's decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Incentives 0.100 (0.014) 0.102 (0.015) 0.007 (0.007) 0.004 (0.007)
Incent. O -0.068 (0.015) -0.066 (0.015) -0.050 (0.010) -0.046 (0.010)
Incent. T -0.060 (0.014) -0.060 (0.014) -0.019 (0.008) -0.018 (0.009)
Incent. O T 0.042 (0.016) 0.040 (0.016) 0.039 (0.012) 0.037 (0.013)
I(Incent.23) 0.465 (0.169) 0.410 (0.175)
O 1.228 (0.375) 1.184 (0.376) 5.258 (1.332) 5.161 (1.322)
T 0.956 (0.293) 0.951 (0.291) 0.610 (0.635) 0.591 (0.636)
OT -0.561 (0.369) -0.514 (0.369) -3.534 (1.445) -3.460 (1.435)
I(Incent.<0) 0.703 (0.535) -0.568 (0.442)
Exp. wage -0.025 (0.005) -0.025 (0.005)
Exp.w.O -0.042 (0.011) -0.042 (0.011)
Exp.w.T -0.003 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005)
Exp.w.OT 0.029 (0.012) 0.029 (0.012)
I(Exp.w.100) -0.500 (0.177) -0.539 (0.179)
Intercept -1.711 (0.299) -1.743 (0.300) 2.491 (0.614) 2.570 (0.618)
2 199.964 201.173 239.480 242.313
No. obs. 1042 1042 1380 1380
Signicance levels: y:10% :5% :1%
(1) and (2): probability of investment, (3) and (4) probability of rejecting the contract (probit).
37Table 13: Random eects regressions: wages and agent decisions, all periods (see table 7).
Exp. w. Exp. w. Incentives Incentives Invest. Reject.
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
OT -13.773 -12.937 -0.614 -0.577 0.008 0.041
(5.770) (2.433) (2.795) (2.796) (0.055) (0.063)
O -20.624 -12.957 9.443 10.218y 0.057 0.078
(13.594) (15.489) (5.856) (5.428) (0.081) (0.029)
T 4.517 6.543 2.490 2.580 0.018 0.014
(2.058) (4.229) (2.121) (2.160) (0.089) (0.069)
Intercept 145.218 151.398 18.623 18.173 0.564 0.188
(12.357) (13.706) (4.175) (4.194) (0.135) (0.037)
No. obs. 1380 1042 1380 1042 1042 1380
Signicance levels: y:10% :5% :1%
The rejection decision is assumed to depend on the expected wage (calculated here using
the agent's subjective success probability, but excluding the investment decision), and the
wage dierence between high and low outcomes (as a proxy for risk). The outside option
of 100 points is captured by a dummy. Again I allow wage expectation and incentives to
interact with the self-condence bias. In line with standard predictions, the probability of
rejection depends negatively on the expected wage. As indicated by the coecient on OT,
there is also a strong and signicant negative eect of an overcondence bias (conditional
on expected wage), conrming result 4.
(2) and (4) include a dummy for negative incentives, to check if agents make unexpected
decisions in response to negative wage dierences, but the coecients are insignicant (and
their signs suggest that negative incentives are, if anything, more attractive). Note that the
eect of the wage dierence on the rejection probability is negative in the overcondent group,
but much smaller in U and slightly positive in (U,C). This might indicate group dierences
in risk attitudes, with overcondent agents more risk loving. In table 8, regressions (1) and
(3) are used.
38C Belief Signalling
Suppose the principal holds posterior beliefs P with expectation a after observing the agent's
signal about ability ^ a and his beliefs A. Rewrite the agent's expected success probability as
(0:05+0:3I(invest)+0:2^ a), with ^ a 2 [0;3] (each integer corresponding to the four trivia score
categories between 0 and 10). Letting wH   wL = 23, the lowest incentive compatible oer
that theoretically satises the participation constraint is ^ wL = 31:95 4:6^ a. The principal's
type is given by the deviation of his beliefs from the agent's, x = a   ^ a. At (^ wH; ^ wL), the
principal's prot is 96:75 + 21^ a + 7:2x. One can calculate the constant wage which makes
the principal indierent between ^ w and ( ^ wL; ^ wH) as ^ w = 29:5 + 4:6x (taking into account
that the agent will not invest at the at wage).
Figure 2 illustrates the case where ^ a = 2 and x = 1, so that the agent is undercondent.
The lowest incentive compatible wage pair is (^ wL; ^ wH) = (27:35;50:35). The dotted lines
are the agent's and principal's indierence curves in wL-wH-space for ^ a (the lowest integer
oer is slightly above these curves at (27,51)). The solid lines are their indierence curves
through (^ wL; ^ wH) at the principal's beliefs ^ a+x. Note that the principal's indierence curve
is discontinuous at the incentive compatibility line, since output increases as a result of higher
eort, and that the agent's indierence curves intersect at the constant wage of 100=3, the
at wage which makes an agent indierent between accepting the contract and taking the
outside option ((34;33) with only integer wages). The principal's indierence curve under
P crosses the 45-degree line at (34:1;34:1).
Now suppose there is a pooling equilibrium in which the principal oers the incentive
contract corresponding to the agent's beliefs, here (27:35;50:35), and consider any contract
in the area ABCD. These contracts are (weakly) preferred by both the principal and the
agent under ^ a + x, but they are strictly worse for a principal with belief ^ a. By the intuitive
criterion, the agent should not believe that an oer in this area was made by the ^ a type,
and there cannot be a pooling equilibrium. In fact, all contracts in this area to the right of
the grey dotted line are preferred by the agent for any belief between ^ a and ^ a + x. By a
similar argument pooling at contracts with wH   wL 6= 23 cannot be sustained. Moreover,
even without using the intuitive criterion, in the gure there is a subarea of wages in ABCD
which would always be (weakly) preferred by both principal and agent, in particular including
the constant wage (34;34).The only restriction on this argument is that the principal's
indierence curve has to lie to the right of the agent's, and this is the case only if x  5
6, i.e.
if at least some agents are suciently undercondent.
This game has many equilibria, some of which involve partial pooling. As an example I will
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Figure 2: Indierence curves in wL-wH-space.
characterize a full separating equilibrium.
For any two principal types a0 = ^ a+x0 and a00 = ^ a+x00, the contracts chosen in equilibrium




H + 3(0:65   0:2a1)w
1
L  3(0:35 + 0:2a1)w
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H + 3(0:65   0:2a1)w
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L
for a1 equal to a0 and a00 and (wi
L;wi
H) the contract associated with ai, i = 1;2. For this to
hold wL and wH must be strictly increasing and decreasing in a, respectively, i.e. incentives
fall with ability. A sucient condition is for example that
dwL





This section provides the instructions for a typical experimental session in chronological
order. All instructions were read out loud and displayed on the computer screen. Subjects
also received a paper version of the instructions. The instructions here are for a session
where the treatment is administered rst. Square brackets [] indicate a new \page" on the
computer screen.
Stage 1: Trivia Quiz
[screen 1]
Welcome!
40Thank you for participating in this study. Please read and sign the letter of consent.
Switch o your cell phones and other electronic devices, and put your personal belongings away.
Please do not speak with each other during the experiment. If you have questions at any point,
please raise your hand and wait until I come over, to speak to me in private.
During this experiment you will have opportunities to earn or spend points. All your decisions
and earnings will be recorded under the computer number (labxx). At the end of the experiment,
the number of points associated with each computer number will be converted into US dollars.
For every two points that you earn you will receive $0.01.
At the end of the experiment I will enter your earnings in a payment form, which you can then
redeem at the bursar's oce at 25 West 4th Street (petty cash).
[screen 2]
Stage 1
The experiment will be conducted in three stages. Instructions will be given along the way.
This is Stage 1. You will now be asked 10 trivia questions.
With each correct answer you earn 20 points.
Please click \Start" to begin the trivia quiz.
[quiz questions - 1 per screen, multiple choice answers (correct answer in italics)]
1. What is South America's highest peak? Mt. Sim on Bol var; Mt. Ancohuma; Mt. Aconcagua;
Mt. Pumasillo
2. John Adams and Thomas Jeerson, the 2nd and 3rd Presidents of the United States, both died
on what day? October 30, 1801; March 4, 1809; January 25, 1840 July 4, 1826
3. The Italian village of Pompeii was destroyed in 79 AD by what type of natural disaster? Flood;
Earthquake; Volcano; Wildres
4. Jim Morrison (lead singer of The Doors), Elvis Presley, and Jimi Hendrix all died from what?
Heart attack; Car accident; Suicide; Drug overdose
5. Which team won the rst Super Bowl? Green Bay Packers; Baltimore Colts; New York Jets;
Kansas City Chiefs
6. What actor holds the record for having been nominated most frequently for the "Best Actor"
Academy Award (9 times)? Dustin Homan; Spencer Tracy; Paul Newman; Jack Nicholson
7. What is the largest species of whale? Sperm whale; Blue whale; Orca (Killer whale); Bowhead
whale
8. Laudanum is a form of what drug? Chloral hydrate; Valium; Opium; Mescaline
9. Who was the rst African American to win an Academy Award for best actress? Angela
Bassett; Whoopi Goldberg; Jennifer Hudson; Halle Berry
10. What is the capital city of Germany? Bonn; Frankfurt; Berlin; Amsterdam
41[score guess]
You answered all 10 questions.
Now please guess as accurately as possible how many of them you think you answered correctly.
You earn 100 points minus the square of the dierence between your guess and your actual score.
In other words, the further your guess is away from your actual score, the less points you earn, and
the decrease is quadratic.
For example, if you have 7 right answers, but your guess is 4, you earn 100-9=91 points. If you
guess 8, you earn 100-1 = 99 points.
Stage 2: Contracting Rounds
[screen 1]
Stage 2
You will now enter Stage 2 of the experiment. Stage 2 consists of two parts, each with 2 trial rounds
and 15 paying rounds.
Imagine that you are participating in a job market. Based on the results of Stage 1, you will be
divided into two groups (Group 1 and Group 2), and within each group some of you are going to
be employers, and some of you are going to be employees.
Your role will be the same for the entire experiment. Employers and employees will only interact
through the computer and never be in direct contact.
At the beginning of each round, each employer is paired up randomly with one employee from
the same group. The employer is going to make a job oer, that is, (s)he oers the employee a
certain amount of points for completing a job that consists of three "tasks". Each task has two
possible outcomes, H(igh) and L(ow). If the outcome is H, then the employee makes a high number
of points for the employer. If the outcome is L, then the employer earns less.
The employee does not have to accept the job oer. If (s)he does accept the oer, (s)he can
increase the probability of getting high outcomes in the three tasks by investing some of his/her
own points.
To show you how this works, we will go through a typical round, rst from the employee's, then
from the employer's perspective.
[screen 2]
Stage 2
As an employee you start each round with a budget of20 points. You rst receive a job oer from
your employer of that round. The employer makes a job oer to the employee by choosing two
"wages": what (s)he pays for each task in which the outcome is H, and what (s)he pays for each
task with outcome L.
42You do not have to accept the oer. If you reject it, you receive an additional 100 points and the
round ends.
If you want to accept the oer, you also have to decide whether you want to invest your budget in
the job or not. By investing, you increase the probability of receiving a high outcome in each task.
Once you have accepted the oer and decided on your investment, the computer will determine
the outcome of the job (that is, whether each of the three tasks had high or low outcomes).
Importantly, the probability of a high outcome depends not only on the investment, but also on
your trivia score from Stage 1. Your trivia score decides how likely the high outcome is for each
task, regardless of how much you invested in a given round.
If two employees make the same investment decision, the person with the higher score is more
likely to get high outcomes.
Once the outcomes of the three tasks have been determined, you will receive the appropriate wage
for each, and it will be added to your total points. If you did not invest, the 20 budget points are
added to your total as well.
[Subjects are shown the employee decision screen and have time to familiarize themselves with it.]
[Four questions to test understanding; subjects can go back to the employee screen to answer
them.]
1. Suppose an employee thinks his score is 5. What is the probability that the outcome of each
task is H if he does not invest? (Answer: 0.25)
2. Suppose an employee thinks her score is 9. What is the probability that the outcome of each
task is H if she does invest? (Answer: 0.95)
3. Suppose this employee does not invest. How often, approximately, can she expect that her
outcome will be H? (round to whole number) (Answer: 2)
4. If her wages are X=200 and Y=100, how much can she expect to earn (rounded to whole




As an employer you make a job oer to the employee by choosing two "wages": what you pay for
each task in which the outcome is H, and what you pay for each task with outcome L.
If the employee rejects the oer, you earn 0 points and the round ends.
If the employee accepts the oer, your earnings depend on the outcomes of the 3 tasks. In turn,
the probability of outcome H in each task depends on the employee's <N| !text: 0="trivia";
1="assigned";> score and his/her investment.
To make it easier for you to choose the wage, you have access to the employee screen where you
can test what your own wage oer looks like. Moreover, you can see the trivia scores and guesses of
43the employees in your group (although you will not get information about individual employees).
Once your employee has decided, the computer will determine the outcomes of the three tasks. You
will receive the earnings associated with them, minus the wage that you oered your employee for
each.
[All subjects now see the employer screen.]
[screen 4]
After the employer and the employee made their decisions, they learn how many of the three
tasks had outcome H or L, and how much they earned in this round; unless of course the oer was
rejected (in which case the employee receives 120 points, the employer earns nothing).
This ends the round, and a new round begins.
|||{
Please wait until the experimenter starts Part 1 of Stage 2.
[screen 5: group and role assignment]
You have been assigned to
Group [1/2]
For the remainder of this experiment, you are an
[Employer/Employee].
When you are ready, you will enter Part 1 of Stage 2, consisting of 2 trial rounds and 15 paying
rounds.
In each round you will be randomly matched with one employee from your group.
Remember that you can use the help button for explanations.
Please click when you are ready to start.
[The 17 rst rounds start. Below is the employer screen; note that in the experiment there are at
least 4 agents shown in the graph of test scores and score guesses]
44[employee screen]
[resolution screen - example employee]
[After 17 rounds, Part 2 of Stage 2 starts]
45Stage 2 - Part 2
You have completed the rst part of Stage 2. In Part 2 there will be again 2 trial rounds and 15
paying rounds. You remain an [employer/employee] in group [1/2].
The only thing that changes from Part 1 is the score that determines the probability of outcome
H. In Part 1, it was the trivia score from Stage 1.
In Part 2 it will be a number between 0 and 10 selected at random for each employee.
As an employee, you won't learn your own score, and as an employer you will not know your
employee's score. But on the employee screen you can see a graphic display of the scores of
all the employees in your group.
Please click when you are ready to start.
Questionnaire
[there were some questions that are not used in the analysis. they are omitted here.]
[personal characteristics (multiple choice)]
 My gender
 Are you Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?
 Race (check all that apply): (American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Black or African
American, Native Hawaiian or other Pacic Islander, White)
[nal screen - payos]
Thank you! You have completed the experiment.
You earned [points from Stage 1, points from Stage 2, total points]
Total earnings in US$ (incl. participation base compensation) [ total earnings]
46